Members of the Fellowship Collective involved in projects flagged by the OG tracker should provide a proper explanation, return the funds to the Treasury, or face expulsion.
#340 Funding a Decision Deposit Sponsor
Summary
Requested amount: 3,333 KSM
Recipient: GqdJv3Kgva6AckTFT8N8ZGXzAuXWU5RjK4auNvKCEu7jmzV
Timeline: ~6 months (then refunded back to the Treasury)
Communication Channel: https://t.me/KSM_DD_SPONSOR
Discussion Context: https://kusama.polkassembly.io/post/2610
Problem
There are many well-intentioned individuals in the ecosystem that would like to try bold experiments on Kusama, but lack the necessary funds to place large decision deposits on the more powerful openGov tracks. This bottlenecks experimentation on the network, limiting it to the whims of whales who may not have the creativity or understanding to push innovation on Kusama.
Pushing a powerful referendum into the decision period should be expensive to prevent malicious attacks, but it inherently prevents highly reputable and good users who don't have tens of thousands of dollars from pushing new and exciting ideas without winning the whim of a whale.
Proposed Solution
I propose funding a multisig-managed governance proxy whose signatories consist of a good number of ecosystem agents with super majority threshold. This configuration ensures that only governance actions could be taken with these Treasury funds. The social layer of the signatories ensures that we only use these funds to place decision deposits and not to vote on referenda or delegate to anyone.
If the ecosystem approves and funds this initiative, we will first test it by placing the decision deposit on a root track referendum that will schedule a balances.forceTransfer
of the 3,333 KSM back to the Treasury at block #24,300,000, effectively limiting the timeline of this experiment. Since the longest decision period is ~200,000 blocks, we will need to cease decision deposit activity by block #24,000,000 to ensure that the funds are free to transfer back to the Treasury. After the funds get transferred back to the Treasury, we can assess how this experiment performed.
This will be a passive experiment, meaning that we won’t actively try to elicit referenda from the community. Rather, we will field sponsorship requests on a case-by-case basis as they come in. The amount being funded will only allow us to sponsor one root track referendum OR many other-track referenda at a time. This means we’ll need to be selective in the case of multiple referenda requesting sponsorship. Given the experience of the signatories we hope the ecosystem can trust our discretion in placing deposits.
Signatories
Eduardo Cardoso
EkQWFRUHmSt8qCwmgYv8TNSaFu1Xo5DaDAHBZbZZFxXMwDr
Professional with extensive experience (more than 20 years) and award-winning projects. BizDev with creative approach and specialist in content, product planning, brand, technology and media, among other subjects related to innovation in Communication, Branding, Design and Advertising. Resume link.
Rafael Yahlomi
EY8GTvBftdX9FgcwNAEcShiLzGuWbFcgueFweQdpatz7cYK
PhD. in economics (distinction in Asset pricing),12 years quant developer (R, Python), 4 years nodes operator, Validator/Collator on multiple DOTSAMA projects (Polkadot 1kv, Kusama 1kv, Moonbeam & Moonriver). LinkedIn.
Tommi Niemi
EtommijqrHDFWFvBxP515oUbkXx9vK2qohzrmwpCXbU7Yx2
Tommi, ecosystem validator for around 3 years and IBP infrabuilder for South East Asia at Rotko Networks, is a full-stack developer. Maintains open Proxmox Ansible rolebooks for running blockchains(Unlabored).
Adam Steeber
GqC37KSFFeGAoL7YxSeP1YDwr85WJvLmDDQiSaprTDAm8Jj
B.S of Economics from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities: August 2017. 7 years of sales and marketing experience. 4 years of business & project management: CTO/ CFO of Steeber Solutions LLC. At least 1 year of FT experience in media, content creation, and social media management. Started in the Kusama ecosystem in April of 2021 as an independent validator, receiving enough organic nominations (outside of TVP) to be elected in the active set. Expanded into RMRK technology and was inducted in the TVP in fall of 2021. Went full time into the ecosystem at the beginning of December 2021. Earned expertise in RMRK 2.0.0 development working on numerous projects. Moved on to data developments on Kusama with a Treasury-funded Chainlink integration. Currently an overall ecosystem agent, working for the betterment of Polkadot and Kusama both technically and socially.
Account Details
4-threshold multisig: EXo39uH9JZFu7Sijc79RmQUoWkamK25EEzpjCdikhrqW8sX
Governance pure proxy which will receive the funds from this spend: GqdJv3Kgva6AckTFT8N8ZGXzAuXWU5RjK4auNvKCEu7jmzV
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Overall 100 % of users are feeling neutral. The discussion revolves around creating an alternative solution to deposit-related issues on Polkadot's referendum track by proposing a new system instead of relying on multi-sigs. The idea has been posted for community feedback and consideration.
AI-generated from comments
How do you envision a slashing event in case the submission is malicious and the community decides to slash the deposit? the submitter and the DD holders would not be punished as these are funds coming from treasury, and going back there if the DD is slashed — so the negative incentive for malicious behaviour is virtually null.
Also, what about using a proxy?
setup is a 4/4 threshold multisig configuration, intricately designed to govern a pure proxy that's strictly limited to governance actions. design ensures an immutable constraint: the KSM funds allocated for governance experimentation cannot be reallocated, transferred, or otherwise utilized outside the scope of submitting Governance-type transactions.
by voting yes to this proposal, stakeholders are doing trade-off: the relinquishment of the conventional slashing deterrent against proposers in favor of amplifying experimental governance ventures. This exchanges posits trust in individual participants within the multisig(4/4 treshold config) over slashing mechanism, emphasizing the reliance on the due diligence and integrity of at least one of these individuals to vet proposals responsibly.
for me personally, the prospect of slashing event transform into a matter of reputational stake. inherent design here implicitly trusts at least one participants judgement and ethical conduct. i do agree that it would be way better to have real sponsor to deposits from their own bag and having skin in the game for doing that, but there has not been much of any upside/incentive for doing that.
Thanks for your comment Raul! Tommi had some good words regarding the incentive tradeoff. KSM holders agree to remove slashing as a deterrent in exchange for a Treasury funded program that can sponsor large DDs. If we sponsor a malicious referendum our reputations will be tarnished, so that replaces the disincentive of slashing. Plus, a slash effectively terminates this experiment so it does protect against perpetually sponsoring malicious referenda. However this relies on the trust people have in the four signatories listed - it's assumed that we care about our reputation and will act with integrity. So it's up to voters to decide if this tradeoff is sound.
Regarding using a proxy - we are! The beneficiary of this spend is a governance pure proxy of the multisig, here's the transaction in which we made the pure proxy: https://kusama.subscan.io/multisig_extrinsic/21680238-5?call_hash=0xb27e08e28211f7f48a3b1eb3227b17da837d5dd06e482cca81ff5d36a17ed4a8.
Voted Aye
did not foresee this timeline where I would be joining tech Lions Club, but here we go. I do feel that we need way more experimentation to be done and should do more to enable it. This 6 month trial with small but full threshold multisig can work as a starting point to lower the barrier for entry without sacrificing chain security.
I also want to not out that multisig we have set up gives permissions just for Governance actions so we are not able to do transactions out of this address requiring us to use forceTransfer to refund funds back to the treasury.
In long term I wish we can find more volunteers for larger multisig enabling a bit lower participation threshold than current 100%.
I agree with the notion that decision deposits can be a barrier for well-intentioned individuals. However, I share some reservations about the effectiveness of multisig in the long run. Instead, I believe we should work on allowing multiple accounts to contribute varying amounts towards the deposit for a referendum, making it more inclusive, similar to Gov 1's public referenda endorsements. Afterwards, we can actually consider slashing those DDs in case of a negative outcome.
Thanks for the comment Otar. I agree that the long term solution is to enable crowdfunding DDs. However, I don't think this feature is a priority in the Fellowship and no one to date has made an RFC (or PR/issue in the SDK) to get the ball rolling. Maybe there's a plan to implement this feature that I'm unaware of, but from where I'm sitting it doesn't look like it'll be shipped any time soon.
Hopefully by the time this experiment is complete, this crowdfunding of DDs will be a new feature of openGov!
Some thoughts:
overall figuring a way to get a decision deposit for contentious stuff is a good idea but then there are some issues:
- in general, this is an interesting idea, but still feels like you're trying to engineer chaos, without the requisite dare i say rock n' roll mentality.
- who decides what is / isn't malicious? having tried to burn the kusama treasury that was considered malicious, yet it was grounded in real insight and is I would argue exactly the sort of chaotic experiment we should see play out for real - adam, you wanted to kill it so tbh that already makes me think the group is too conservative.
- you can crowdsource DD contributions without some new tools, you need to think about encouraging risk as a mentality, not via more bureauracy... for example, i was serious about using my own KSM from a proposal to burn the treasury, people should see risking KSM on something they care about as worth the possible loss.
- one other general point - what are the sorts of experimental ideas you want to see tested via root?
imo it make more sense to run this the other way around... cultivate some 'wild' ideas, then submit them to root, and encourage people to contribute to specific proposal DD pools and mint them soulbound NFTs that have some cultural significance.
encourage a risk taking culture, rather than tip toeing around hoping it'll show up if we just design a new system. there are a lot of very wealthy KSM holders... id like to see some of them put some extra skin in the game rather than relying on the serfs to dance to a merry tune.
Thank you for sharing your thoughts. I do apologize if I don't exude a rock n' roll vibe, but I am quite excited about this initiative! Otherwise I wouldn't have revived the idea from when I first proposed it last November.
As far as determining what is/isn't malicious, that will still be KSM voters. Sure if this referendum passes we'll be able to place big DDs, but that doesn't mean we will alter a referendum's pass or fail outcome. So while we might think something is/isn't malicious, KSM holders can always disagree with us and place DDs/vote accordingly.
Regarding my referendum killer, remember that I didn't think burning the Treasury was malicious in and of itself. It was that Decent Partners proposed it out of spite when his ridiculous funding request started getting heavy NAYs. It was the fact that he was asking for funds while also proposing to burn the Treasury simultaneously that made me determine it was malicious. DP's proposal to burn the Treasury was guised "in real insight" when in reality it was just a giant F.U. to everyone NAYing DP's funding request. So while you may think I'm too conservative, I am very open to forthright chaotic experiments.
you can crowdsource DD contributions without some new tools
I have yet to see anyone achieve this. The Kusama ecosystem is small and rallying people to send enough of their KSM to some greater cause is incredibly difficult. If you can pull it off, I'd love to see it! Ultimately, funding a DD sponsor doesn't discourage holders to put their skin in the game - anyone will still be free to place DDs if they don't want to appeal to this sponsor.
what are the sorts of experimental ideas you want to see tested via root?
As stated in the proposal, this is a passive program. We aren’t asking people to step up with specific ideas - we are just trying to establish a resource for those who have their own ideas. As a DD sponsor, I don’t think it would be appropriate for us to encourage or discourage referenda since that would centralize the source of inspiration. I believe the community is quite capable of determining what kind of ideas to push using this resource. The only goal is to encourage people to put their ideas on chain knowing there’s recourse for large DDs.
Kusama has been kicking all this time yet we don’t see people encouraging wild ideas, submitting chaotic referenda on chain, or rallying huge DDs. As someone who actually did this with referendum 235, it was very discouraging when my wild idea to reconfigure spending track params via a non-Fellowship referendum got NAY’d and criticized by the Fellowship. And it never would have come to that reckoning if the Virto team didn’t place the DD; it was a deus ex machina. There’s no chance I’d ever want to try something like that again unless I knew a program like this sponsor existed; because why would I put in so much work just for a referendum to timeout and be disregarded by everyone? But that’s just my personal experience.
If you’d like to mint and distribute those soulbound NFTs and somehow bake cultural significance into them, I’d love to see it. Hell, I’d even vote to fund it! But for now, this referendum is what is immediately actionable. It might not be the perfect solution, but we shouldn't sacrifice tangible good for intangible perfection.
Thank you for sharing your thoughts. I do apologize if I don't exude a rock n' roll vibe, but I am quite excited about this initiative! Otherwise I wouldn't have revived the idea from when I first proposed it last November.
To reiterate I like the idea. I also think the idea to introduce a referendum track to pay the DD is good.
Lets stick to debating the merits of the approach rather than more negative stuff, there's a vanishingly small kusama community, so it'd better to figure things out together since no-one can possibly have anything close to a full picture.
As far as determining what is/isn't malicious, that will still be KSM voters.
So can you be clear that the role of the multisig is not to make judgement calls in what is/isn't malicious?
For example, were this to pass, we may well submit a new proposal to:
- burn the kusama treasury
- introduce 'pallet mint' into the runtime
- note this would also require setting up the incoming treasury income to burn rather than pool into a treasury that is in our view a design that can be improved - the current structure tends to create peverse psychological incentives on both proposers and voters.
Right now, I am still unsure how apolitical your stance is, especially since you have previously attempted to 'kill' exactly this proposal.
It was that Decent Partners proposed it out of spite when his ridiculous funding request started getting heavy NAYs. It was the fact that he was asking for funds while also proposing to burn the Treasury simultaneously that made me determine it was malicious.
This was not a kneejerk reaction. We have also previously attempted to burn KappaSigmaMu's pot which continues to stack up and is unusable.
This is what concerns me with an apolitical structure, having a political dimension. What assurances can you provide?
Kusama has been kicking all this time yet we don’t see people encouraging wild ideas, submitting chaotic referenda on chain, or rallying huge DDs. As someone who actually did this with referendum 235, it was very discouraging when my wild idea to reconfigure spending track params via a non-Fellowship referendum got NAY’d and criticized by the Fellowship.
We agree whole-heartedly.
if you’d like to mint and distribute those soulbound NFTs and somehow bake cultural significance into them, I’d love to see it. Hell, I’d even vote to fund it!
As you wish :)
I suppose no one can be totally apolitical since we all have our biases. The only real assurance I can give you is that, given the structure of the program, my duty is to confer with the other signatories on all requests. They are there to mitigate any personal biases I have so I hope they would help me make impartial and dispassionate decisions.
You have to understand that by placing the DD on referenda, we are staking our reputations. It's absolutely reasonable to think burning the Treasury is malicious behavior despite the genuine and critical arguments in favor for it; while you might not agree with that, you do recognize that, right? By sponsoring a referendum we are telling everyone: "we believe this should be executable on a winning vote," so such a statement about a perceived threat can be very damaging to our reputation. We must be mindful of that.
I'll be more specific by addressing one of your examples. Adding pallet::mint
to the relay chain's runtime goes completely against what the Joe Petrowski is trying to lead the Fellowship on - minimize relay chain features outside of security & consensus. We have to remain as harmonious with the Fellowship as possible because it is a major resource for determining the technical direction of Kusama & Polkadot. However, if there is reason to believe that the Fellowship is stonewalling a reasonable idea, then this sponsor can help users circumvent the Fellowship on runtime-related changes.
I guess what I'm trying to say is that sometimes it's really hard to determine what is or isn't malicious. That is why we have 4 well-intentioned ecosystem agents on the multisig to help figure that out together. At the end of the day you're voting on our unanimous discretion.
I apologize if my views, or the views of the other signatories, are not as apolitical as you'd like. That's why I encourage other coalitions to propose funding a multisig-managed sponsor of their own! I would love to see a bunch of these kind of sponsors get funded by the Treasury so people have a robust selection of DD recourse to choose from.
I'd like to propose an alternative - and I think it's really an ecosystem issue, so I've posted it here:
https://forum.polkadot.network/t/creating-a-decision-deposit-referendum-track/5982
TL;DR Why don't we create a referendum track to place the deposit, rather than messing about with multi-sigs?
Excellent idea! Please be sure to submit a formal RFC to ensure that the Fellowship gets on top of adding such a track. In my experience, if it's not an immediate priority then they won't implement it very quickly (or at all). So in the meantime this sponsor can handle DD requests.
I can assure you, getting that track into a Kusama runtime upgrade is an order of magnitude more complicated, both technically and socially, than messing about with multisigs. It's the shortest path to any kind of solution to this specific problem.
@AdamClaySteeber My comment wasn't intended as an attack — sorry if my wording was poor. I was thinking about raising an RFC, but I couldn't decide if it was "big enough" to warrant it.
Voted Aye
Can you provide any examples of initiatives that absolutely have to use `root`, but the proposers don't have the funds to make the DD?
This one — though I did find someone to put up the deposit in the end (it would have been quicker if I hadn't had to wait).
https://kusama.polkassembly.io/referenda/213
I assume this one doesn't have access to a deposit:
https://kusama.polkassembly.io/referenda/338
And there have been other para ID-related proposals that seem to have struggled to find deposits in the past. Some of these might be resolve now - I was expecting to need a root referendum to retire paraId 2268 in the face of a lock, but it had been cleared by a recent update.
Not sure about non-para id related ones.
@METASPAN anything is open for people to request DDs so I can't enumerate all possible referenda that could be endorsed, but I can give a few examples.
- Para id stuff (as mentioned by JelliedOwl). Parachain teams can certainly appeal to us!
- forceTransfer of funds lost by earnest accident (with verifications of course)
- Trivial runtime changes being ignored by the Fellowship
- Staking reconfigurations
- Cancelling/killing a referendum
- Housekeeping (cleaning up bounty spam, clearing up unnecessary storage)
- Preimage requests
- Scheduler experiments
Some of these don't require root but any referendum on any track can be sponsored by this program. I hope this gives you a better idea. Ultimately, we aren't going to encourage any initiatives - we'll simply let community members decide what to request sponsorship for. As long as it's a reasonable proposal and the funds aren't tied up in other DDs, I don't see us denying sponsorship.
Thanks for the examples.
This initiative is highlighting an underlying problem with the "cost of doing business" (i.e. making decisions) for the chain:
> Why is it so expensive to put certain decisions to a vote?
TBH, I was undecided on this one, and I still don't see the full usecase...
What's the risk? GBP 125k funds being mismanaged by 5 people who are well known to the community — quite low, they would be toasted!
I will support this as the funds will return to the treasury at the end of the experiment, (and the operators are not asking for any remuneration for their time)
We are the canary chain after all..!
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Fellowship Admin
Fellowship Admin
Members of the Fellowship Collective involved in projects flagged by the OG tracker should provide a proper explanation, return the funds to the Treasury, or face expulsion.
Invarch failed to provide the first two, so Gabe, a founding member of the team, does not meet the ethical standards required to have a voice in the Fellowship.
TENETS (extract from the fellowship manifesto)
"Members are expected to faithfully uphold the following tenets.
Clarifications to the rules should be in agreement with these tenets. Acting in clear breach of these tenets may be considered by voters as grounds for non-promotion, demotion or, in extreme cases, exclusion from the Fellowship.
(1) Sincerely uphold the interests of Polkadot and avoid actions which clearly work against it.
(2) Respect the philosophy and principles of Polkadot.
(3) Respect the operational procedures, norms and voting conventions of the Fellowship.
(4) Respect your fellow Members and the wider community"
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KSM RFP #1 - Shielded Kusama Hub Transfers - $50k Total Prize!
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Treasurer
Treasurer
This RFP was adapted over several weeks on AAG to turn a treasury proposal in discussion to an RFP with refined scope and oversight.
To apply for the prize pls fill out this form.
Prize Pool: $43,000
Finder’s Fee: $2,000 **
Supervisors: $5,000
Supervisors (Bounty Curators)
- Flipchan
- Byte (Erin)
- James Slusser
Excess or unused funds will be returned to the treasury by Bounty Curators.
Timeline
Monday, March 17 - AAG Discussion & this forum post! ✅
Monday, March 24 - Single-ref Bounty + Curators ✅
4 Weeks after Bounty Funding - Submission Deadline Thursday
July 31 - Project Completion (Pending Kusama Hub Launch)
Project Scope
Smart Contract Development
- A Solidity-based smart contract deployed on Kusama Hub
- ZK enabled for private deposits & withdrawals
- Compatibility with all Kusama Hub assets
User Interface
- Browser-based, mobile-ready UI hosted on IPFS
- Support for: Deposits, Withdrawals, Transfers, XCM Transfers
- Compatible with popular ecosystem wallets (Nova Wallet, Talisman, Subwallet)
Anti-correlation Attack Mitigations:
- Fixed deposit amounts (e.g. 1, 10, 100, 1000 units)
- Batch payouts for withdrawals to multiple users
Interoperability - Ability to receive assets via XCM from any Kusama-connected parachain and transfer them to Kusama Hub for use in shielded pool.
Open-Source Delivery
- All code (smart contracts and UI) published under the MIT license
- Publicly accessible repositories Project updates shared transparently via Polkassembly, Subsquare, or Polkadot Forum from Team with Milestone deliveries
- Developer & User documentation
Milestones
Milestone 1, Initial Pools & Basic UI:
$16,200 USD
1 month
- Tests - Smart contract test
- Smart contract - ZK shielded smart contract with KSM and multi asset support on Westend or Paseo
- Basic UI - A basic UI for interacting with the smart contract
Milestone 2, UI + XCM:
$9,900
1 month
- Tests - tests for all features
- User interface design - UI design
- XCM transfers - XCM transfer assets in UI
- Fixed amount transfer only - Allow fixed amount transfers in the UI
Milestone 3, Mainnet Deployment:
$16,900
1 - 1.5 months
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- Public documentation - Documentation for using Kusama shield and developer integration documentation
- Test - tests for contract
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** re: Finder’s Fee: this payment is set aside to incentivize a broad search for the right implementor. Finder’s Fees are paid out at time of team engagement. Teams that submit themselves can collect their own Finder’s Fee at completion of project.
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