Funding a Decision Deposit Sponsor
Summary
Requested amount: 3,333 KSM
Recipient: GqdJv3Kgva6AckTFT8N8ZGXzAuXWU5RjK4auNvKCEu7jmzV
Timeline: ~6 months (then refunded back to the Treasury)
Communication Channel: https://t.me/KSM_DD_SPONSOR
Discussion Context: https://kusama.polkassembly.io/post/2610
Problem
There are many well-intentioned individuals in the ecosystem that would like to try bold experiments on Kusama, but lack the necessary funds to place large decision deposits on the more powerful openGov tracks. This bottlenecks experimentation on the network, limiting it to the whims of whales who may not have the creativity or understanding to push innovation on Kusama.
Pushing a powerful referendum into the decision period should be expensive to prevent malicious attacks, but it inherently prevents highly reputable and good users who don't have tens of thousands of dollars from pushing new and exciting ideas without winning the whim of a whale.
Proposed Solution
I propose funding a multisig-managed governance proxy whose signatories consist of a good number of ecosystem agents with super majority threshold. This configuration ensures that only governance actions could be taken with these Treasury funds. The social layer of the signatories ensures that we only use these funds to place decision deposits and not to vote on referenda or delegate to anyone.
If the ecosystem approves and funds this initiative, we will first test it by placing the decision deposit on a root track referendum that will schedule a balances.forceTransfer of the 3,333 KSM back to the Treasury at block #24,300,000, effectively limiting the timeline of this experiment. Since the longest decision period is ~200,000 blocks, we will need to cease decision deposit activity by block #24,000,000 to ensure that the funds are free to transfer back to the Treasury. After the funds get transferred back to the Treasury, we can assess how this experiment performed.
This will be a passive experiment, meaning that we won’t actively try to elicit referenda from the community. Rather, we will field sponsorship requests on a case-by-case basis as they come in. The amount being funded will only allow us to sponsor one root track referendum OR many other-track referenda at a time. This means we’ll need to be selective in the case of multiple referenda requesting sponsorship. Given the experience of the signatories we hope the ecosystem can trust our discretion in placing deposits.
Signatories
Eduardo Cardoso
EkQWFRUHmSt8qCwmgYv8TNSaFu1Xo5DaDAHBZbZZFxXMwDr
Professional with extensive experience (more than 20 years) and award-winning projects. BizDev with creative approach and specialist in content, product planning, brand, technology and media, among other subjects related to innovation in Communication, Branding, Design and Advertising. Resume link.
Rafael Yahlomi
EY8GTvBftdX9FgcwNAEcShiLzGuWbFcgueFweQdpatz7cYK
PhD. in economics (distinction in Asset pricing),12 years quant developer (R, Python), 4 years nodes operator, Validator/Collator on multiple DOTSAMA projects (Polkadot 1kv, Kusama 1kv, Moonbeam & Moonriver). LinkedIn.
Tommi Niemi
EtommijqrHDFWFvBxP515oUbkXx9vK2qohzrmwpCXbU7Yx2
Tommi, ecosystem validator for around 3 years and IBP infrabuilder for South East Asia at Rotko Networks, is a full-stack developer. Maintains open Proxmox Ansible rolebooks for running blockchains(Unlabored).
Adam Steeber
GqC37KSFFeGAoL7YxSeP1YDwr85WJvLmDDQiSaprTDAm8Jj
B.S of Economics from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities: August 2017. 7 years of sales and marketing experience. 4 years of business & project management: CTO/ CFO of Steeber Solutions LLC. At least 1 year of FT experience in media, content creation, and social media management. Started in the Kusama ecosystem in April of 2021 as an independent validator, receiving enough organic nominations (outside of TVP) to be elected in the active set. Expanded into RMRK technology and was inducted in the TVP in fall of 2021. Went full time into the ecosystem at the beginning of December 2021. Earned expertise in RMRK 2.0.0 development working on numerous projects. Moved on to data developments on Kusama with a Treasury-funded Chainlink integration. Currently an overall ecosystem agent, working for the betterment of Polkadot and Kusama both technically and socially.
Account Details
4-threshold multisig: EXo39uH9JZFu7Sijc79RmQUoWkamK25EEzpjCdikhrqW8sX
Governance pure proxy which will receive the funds from this spend:
GqdJv3Kgva6AckTFT8N8ZGXzAuXWU5RjK4auNvKCEu7jmzV
Comments (6)
Requested
Proposal Failed
Summary
0%
Aye
0%
Nay
Aye (115)0.0 DOT
Support0.0 DOT
Nay (137)0.0 DOT
How do you envision a slashing event in case the submission is malicious and the community decides to slash the deposit? the submitter and the DD holders would not be punished as these are funds coming from treasury, and going back there if the DD is slashed — so the negative incentive for malicious behaviour is virtually null.
Also, what about using a proxy?
@RTTI-5220
setup is a 4/4 threshold multisig configuration, intricately designed to govern a pure proxy that's strictly limited to governance actions. design ensures an immutable constraint: the KSM funds allocated for governance experimentation cannot be reallocated, transferred, or otherwise utilized outside the scope of submitting Governance-type transactions.
by voting yes to this proposal, stakeholders are doing trade-off: the relinquishment of the conventional slashing deterrent against proposers in favor of amplifying experimental governance ventures. This exchanges posits trust in individual participants within the multisig(4/4 treshold config) over slashing mechanism, emphasizing the reliance on the due diligence and integrity of at least one of these individuals to vet proposals responsibly.
for me personally, the prospect of slashing event transform into a matter of reputational stake. inherent design here implicitly trusts at least one participants judgement and ethical conduct. i do agree that it would be way better to have real sponsor to deposits from their own bag and having skin in the game for doing that, but there has not been much of any upside/incentive for doing that.
did not foresee this timeline where I would be joining tech Lions Club, but here we go. I do feel that we need way more experimentation to be done and should do more to enable it. This 6 month trial with small but full threshold multisig can work as a starting point to lower the barrier for entry without sacrificing chain security. I also want to not out that multisig we have set up gives permissions just for Governance actions so we are not able to do transactions out of this address requiring us to use forceTransfer to refund funds back to the treasury. In long term I wish we can find more volunteers for larger multisig enabling a bit lower participation threshold than current 100%.