Cheers for sharing your views. While I understand the concerns expressed re: abuse of power, I think that #1 is a bit too harsh a criterion in practice. There are validators out there that are putting time and effort into running their nodes at home and are perfectly entitled to ask for 20% commission from their (often limited number of) nominators. The fact that they consistently get (s)elected by phragmen is evidence that they aren't doing anything harmful to the network in principle. Why go after them? If the issue is the amount of KSM held by validators that could be used to "swing" votes (something I don't see happening easily, thanks to the current governance mechanisms), then using the amount charged in commission by validators is irrelevant to the discussion. Since you don't really want to go after any account just because they hold X amount of KSM that you consider "very large and very centralised", you would want to have an entity that reviews proposals before they reach voting status, which is exactly what the Council is doing already. All in all, I'm not really worried about Cexchanges overtaking governance on Kusama in one form or another. Please feel free to let me know how I might be mistaken. :)

Perhaps I need to add some more context. Centralized staking services like binance or kraken are in control of the private keys of the accounts that they have custodianship for. As it stands, they could use that to vote against increasing the Validator Set count or to support more centralization. What is needed is a way to reduce custodians ability to vote on behalf of their customers. Having a voting power curve relative to commission % further encourages validators to keep their rates lower. Validators who are charging 100 % and active in Validator sets are either one of a few private fortunes or custodianships.