Looking at these two top-up proposals together, I think there is a broader question worth discussing about the collator bounty programme.

The concern is not simply about the cost of the programme, but also about how the funded slots are distributed.

Looking at the corresponding collator selection referenda:

• Polkadot: 30 funded slots across the five System Chains, with 22 unique operators. 8 operators hold 2 slots each, accounting for 16/30 slots (53.3%). Across the three Tier-1 chains alone, 7 operators hold 14/24 slots (58.3%).

• Kusama: 28 funded slots across the four System Chains, with 21 unique operators. 7 operators hold 2 slots each, accounting for 14/28 slots (50%). Across the three Tier-1 chains, 6 operators hold 12/24 slots (50%).

So this is not just a case of a few operators occasionally appearing twice. A relatively small group is repeatedly selected across multiple System Chains on both networks.

I understand the reasoning behind favouring operators with an established track record. Reliability obviously matters for critical infrastructure.

But this also creates a potential self-reinforcing cycle: existing operators get slots -> build more history and multi-chain experience -> become stronger candidates for future slots -> get more slots.

I think the community should discuss whether the current selection process provides enough room for new operators, and whether some limit per operator or another mechanism could improve operator diversity without compromising reliability.

The question is not whether the current operators are reliable. The question is whether the selection model can remain open and competitive over time.

The W3F voting to keep bad actors on the System Chains rather than hold them accountable? What a way to uphold the standards of the ecosystem. 🤡